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This paper examines changes in the degree of money market integration between ten EC member
states and Germany since the start of European Monetary System (EMS) in March 1979. The
empirical analysis relies on calculations of inean deviations from covered interest pari[y (CIP),
ex post uncovered interest parity (UIP) and ex post real interest parity (RIP) of ten EC member
states relative to Germany. In addition, we use forward exchange rate data to decompose those
European money market interest rate differentials relative to Germany. The degree of money market
integration is found todepend crucially on thedevaluation risk as measured by the ex post exchange
risk premium. [n the case of Portugal and Greece also capital controls matter.
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1 Introduction
The present paper deals with a theoretical and empirical analysis of money market integration
in [he European Community (EC). Weexaminechanges in thedegreeof money market integration
between ten EC member states and Germany from the start of the European Monetary System
(EMS) in March 1979. The key question is whether the step-by-step liberatisation of short-term
capital movements in the EC, in preparing for the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), has
brought about a higher or perhaps perfect degree of money market integration in the EC.'
Measuring the degree of money market integra[ion in the EC is most relevant to our understanding
of the extent to which monetary policies of individual EC member states loose their effectiveness
to stabilise Fluctuations in the economy through interest or exchange rate changes.z The empirical
analysis relies on calcttlations of inean deviations from three-month covered, ex post uncovered
and ex post real interest parity of ten EC member states relative to Gennany over the period March
1979 until lune 1993. ln addition, the paper uses forward exchange rate data to decompose mean
deviations from three-month ex post rea] interest parity into a cotmtry premium, an ex post exchange
risk premium and a deviation from ex post relative purchasing power parity.
The paper is organised as follows. Section II introduces the decomposition method of Frankel
and MacArthur (1988) and specifies three alternative interest parity conditions to calculate the
degree of perfect capital mobility in the short-run. Furthermore, Seetion II defines the concept
ofmoney market integration. Section III, describes thedataand sets out theempirical methodology
to calculate mean deviations from interest parity conditions. Section N offers the empirical evidence
on money market integration and discusses the main results. Finally, Section V concludes the
paper.
' The road to the EMU is supposrd to consist of three stages: The tirst s[age, from I July 1990, should accomplish
the liberalisation of financial markets, the enlargement of the membership in Ihe Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM)
of the EMS, and a change in the mandate ofthe Committen of Central Bank Govemors of the EC central banks to
promote tha co-ordination of monetary policies. The second stage, from 1 Janusry 1994, establishes the European
Monetary Institute (EMI), whichwould initially operate alongsidethe national monetary authorities. t)ne of [he main
tasks ofthe EC'scentral banks will be the(preparation ofthe) hxrmonisation oftheir monetary instruments and targets.
In addition, steps will be taken to ensuro full central bank independence from other national authorities. The third
stage, by 1997 at the earliest and t January 1999 at the latest, should accomplish the irrevocable fixing ofexchange
rates among national currencies eligible tojoin the third stage. Eligibilityis based upon the Maastricht convergence
criteria that ECcountries have tomeet. Convergence criteria havebeen formulated with respect toinnation differentiats,
exchànge rate stability,long-term interest rate differentials, fiscal deficitsand government debt. The European Central
Bank (ECB) and the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) will be responsible for the monetary policy in the
participating memher states (see Committee ofGovemors of theCentral Banks of the Member States ofthe European
Economic Community, 1992).
'- See for a discussion ofpolicy implications of financial integration Lamfalussy (1990), The Economist (1992) and
De Groof and Van Tuijl (1993).2
II Interest parity conditions
Quantifying the degree of money market integration between ten EC member states and Germany
implies measuring the degree in which short-term capital flows equalise expected returns on
comparable money market assets denominated in different currencies. Essentially, the criteria
for perfect capital mobility are nothing more than a re-interpretation of the familiar interest parity
conditions.' Following Frankel and MacArthur (1988), Table 1 summarises an ascending order
of three altemative interest parity conditions according to their cumulative assumptions. The criteria
for perfect capital mobility rely on the dispersion ofprices of identical European money market
assets (i.e. short-term interest rates). Hence, they fit into the priceapproach to financial integration
(see Feldman, 1986).' According to Frankel (1989)and Lemmen and Eijffinger (1993b) the interest
parity conditions inTable 1 measure three differenttypes ofperfectcapital mobility. Perfectcapital
mobility of a particular type is taken to be the joint hypothesis that bonds, identical in all respects
apart from their currency denomination, areperfect substitutes and that arbitrage continually ensures
the interest parity condition to hold (see MacDonald 1988, pp. 33-34). The object of interest
arbitrage is to allocate funds between financial markets in order to realize the highest possible
expected retum, subject to the least possible risk.
The first criterion - covered nominal interest parity (CIP) - examines perfect capital mobility of
type l. CIP holds if the forward premium (discount) [f,'k-s,] equals the difference between the
domestic and foreign nominal interest rate at the appropriate maturity [i~,tt-i'.,t~]. Investors
cover themselves against the exchange rate risk of foreign investment in the forward foreign
exchange market. A forwazd premium (discount) on foreign currency means that the forward
price of foreign currency delivered and paid for some time in the future expressed in domestic
currency is higher (lower) than the current spot price, i.e. f;'k-s, is the forward premium when
positive and the forward discount when negative. If the domestic nominal interest rate is higher
(lower) than the foreign nominal interest, the lower (higher) foreign nominal interest rate is
' See e.g. Burda and Wyplosz (1993) chapters 16 and 17. Note also that [he criteria for perfect capital mobility are
related to the standard asset msrket theory of exchange rate determination, see e.g. Kneeshaw and Van den Bergh
(1985, pp. 10-11).
' The Feldstein-Horioka criterion is another criterion for perfect capital mobility. It relies on the co-movement of
dotnestic quartritiesend fits into the qttantity approach to financial integration. Lemmett and Eijffinger (1993a) apply
the Feldatein-Horioka criterion tomoney market integration in the EC. Theauthors show Ihathigh short-term fittancial
and non-financisl capital mobility in the EC may ezplain the low cross-section and time-series correlations between
domestic investment and national savings ratios of EC member states, sincewith integrated money markets adomestic
investor can tap the pool of foreign savings.3
compensated by a forward premium (discount) on the foreign currency. Investors will buy (sell)
foreign currency spot to sell (buy) it forward. A premium (discount) on the foreign currency
corresponds with an expected future risc (fall) in the spot exchange rate. Perfect capital mobility
ot type I implies a zero covered nominal interest differential or in other words a zero country
premium [i,,,,k-i;`.,,k-(t;'k-sJ-O]. With perfect capital mobility of type [, riskless arbitrage
will ensure that C[P holds. Deviations from C[P reflect barriers to the integration of financial
markets across national boundaries such as transaction costs, capital controls, information costs,
tax laws that discriminate by country of residence, default risk and risk of future capital controls
(Frankel 1992, pp. 200-201).
Table 1- Interest parity conditions and their cumulative assumptions
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Sourte: Frankal enJ MecAnhur (19flM) anJ Frenkal (1989).4
The second criterion - ex ante uncovered nominal interest parity (UIP) - examines perfect capital
mobility of type II. UIP holds if the expected returns on comparable domestic and foreign bonds
except for currency of denomination are equal. The expected nominal exchange rate change
[E,(s,tt-sJ] equals the nominal interest differential at the appropriate maturity [i,.,,r-i!.,,~].
Investors takeopen positions in the foreign exchange market. Replacementoftheforward exchange
rate by the expected spot exchange rate [E,(s,,,J-fl't] yields UIP. This replacement is allowed
if exchange rate expectations are held with certainty or if investors are risk-neutral.s Investors
expect an exchange rate deprecation when the domestic nominal interest rate exceeds the foreign
nominal interest rate. The second criterion can be framed in terms of the decomposition method
of Frankel and MacArthur (1988). Frankel and MacArthur decompose the nominal uncovered
interest rate differential in the followingway: i,,,fk-i'.,,k-Er(s,tk-sJ-[i,,,tr-i;`,,,t-(fl'~-sJ]t
[(~}t-sJ-E,(s,tr-sJ]. Ex ante UIP requires a zero country premium [i,.,,t-i;`,,,r-(f,}k-sJ-O]
and a zero exchange risk premium [(fitr-sJ -E,(s,tt-sJ -0]. Because exchange rateexpectations
cannot be observed one generally formulates an assumption on how exchange rate expectations
are formed. When exchange rate expectations are assumed to be rational ez ante UIP changes
into ex post UIP. Rational expectations imply that the realized exchange rate change is used as
aproxy for theexpected exchange ratechange. Thus, ex post UIP holds ifexpectations are rational,
investors are risk neutral and no capital controls exist. The underlying assumption of rationality
means that the fon~ast errors ofexchange rates E(n„t ~IJ -E,(s,.~-s,tk-0 have mean zero. Hence,
the ex ante spot exchange rate at time t-i-k conditional on available information at time t equals
the ex post spot exchange rate at time t~-k, i.e. E,(s,,,J-s,tt. Deviations from ex post UIP may
therefore be caused by the lack of capital mobility of type II and or expectational errors.
Both the CIP and the UIP condition can be used to measure thedegree ofmoney market integration.
CIP holds ifdomestic and covert~ foreígn bonds are perfect substitutes and no country premium
exists. Ex ante UIP holds if domestic and uncovered foreign bonds are perfect substitutes and
no country and exchange risk premium exist. Theoretically, the UIP condition is to be preferrrd
to assess the degree of money market integration because the UIP condition incorporates two
important theoretical aspects of money market integration i.e. the ubiliry and the willingness to
move money marketassets across national borders in response to expected differences in exchange-
adjusted returns while the CIP only incorporates the ubiliry to move money market asse[s across
5 Or in other words, the forward exchange rate is an unbiased predictor of the expected future spot exchange rate
(see MacDonald and Taylor 1992, p. 38).5
national borders (see e.g. Boothe et al. 1985, Caramazza et al. 1986, Akhtar and Weiller 1987,
Reinhart and Weiller 1987a). The country premium reFlects the ability to move money market
assets across national borders while the exchange risk premium reflects the willingness to move
money market assets across national borders. The CIP condition is a more appropriate criterion
for geographical money market segmentation across countries while the ex ante UIP condition
is a more appropriate criterion for the overall analysis ofintegration between short-term financial
markets i.e. the money and the foreign ezchange market (Haldane and Pradhan 199b, p. 5). Booth
et al. (1985, p. l6) denote CIP with perfect capital mobility and ex ante UIP with perfect capital
substitutability. We denote CIP with perfect capital mobility of type I and ex ante UIP with perfect
capital mobility of type 11.
The third criterion - ex ante real interest parity (RIP) - examines perfect capital mobility of type
I[I or in other words perfect tïnancial and non-financial capital mobility (see Haldane and Pradhan
1992b, p. 5). Non-financial capital mobility refers to the mobility of goods and services and the
mobility of the production factors labour and physical capital (technology). Ex ante RIP means
that the expected domestic and foreign real interest rate are equal [i~(r,,t,~-E,(r;~.,t,~]. The third
criterion can also be framed in terms of the decomposition method of Frankel and MacArthur.
The ex ante real interest differential can be decomposed as follows: E,(r,tk-r;`,~-(i,,tk-
~(R.t-PJ)-(i'~.k-~(P~`tk-P~`))-(i~.~.t-i'.~tk)-~(P~tt-PJf~íP~`.r-p;`). By adding and
subtracting the forward premium (discount)and theexpected depreciation ofthedomesticcurrency
in terms of foreign currency, we obtain an expression of the ex ante real interest differential:
~(rt~tk - r~t A tk) - [tt.i tk - t i~.ttt - (P }k - iI] } [(Í;k - W - ~(Sttk - aI] } L~(Sltk - Piik } Pi~ ttJ-(~ - P~ } P')]
(see also Goldstein et al. 1991, p. 9).6 The last two factors together constitu[e the currency
premium, because they pertain to differences in assets according to the currency in which they
are denominated, rather than [he political jurisdiction in which they are issued. Thus, ex ante
RIP requires not only a zero country premium and a zero exchange risk premium but also a zero
expected real exchange rate change or in other words a zero deviation from ex ante relative
purchasing power parity(PPP) [E,(s,tk-P~tr }P~`.k)-(~ -P~ f P~`) -0]. Theexpected realexchange
rate change is the change in the nominal ezchange rate corrected for the expected inflation
differential between two countries [E,(s,tk-P~.kfP`tr)-(~-P~fP~`)l. The existence of ex ante
relative PPP also means that the ezpected nominal exchange rate change equals the expected
" Ifex ante UIP hold. ex ante real int~resl rate difkrontialti between two countries rotlect differenccs in inFlationary
expr.~tations.6
inflation differential [E,(s„k-sJ-E,(p,tk-pJ-E,(p'.k-p;`)l. Eventually, substitution of ex ante
relative PPP[E,(s„t-sJ - (p,tk -pJ -(P~`.~ -P~`)l into theUIPcondition [i,.,tk -i;`.,tk -E,(s,tk-sJl
leads to the RIP condition E,(r,t,J-i,,,,k-E,(p,.t-PJ-E,(r;`„J-i',,~k-E,(P;`tk-p;`). Again, the
ex ante real interest rate is difficult to measure since expected inflation and hence the ex ante
real interest rate is not observable. The calculation of ex post real interest rate differentials
implicitly assumes that expectations are rational. The ex post real interest rate is defined as the
nominal interest rate minus the realized rate of inflation: r,.,tk-i,.,tk-(R4k-PJ for the domestic
country and r;`.,,k-i;`.,,r-(p;`tk-p;`) for the foreign country. The forecast errors of inFlation
equal the forecast errors of real interest rates: ritk-E,(r~,,.~-r,,,,k-E,(p,tr-pJ-(p,.k-pJ and
e;~ tk- E,(r' ,,,J -r;` „k-E,(p;`,t -p;`) -(p;`,k -p;`). The forecast errors ofinflationand real interest
rateS E(E,tk~ IJ-O and E(e;`tr~IJ-O have mean zero, hence, E,(L„~k)-r„tk ánd Fy(iM`,tk)-r~i.~tk~
The equality of real interest rates across countries than implies (Mishkin 1984, p. 1347):
F,(r~.~t~ -~(r ~`.~tt) -r~.~tk -r`.~tt-
III Data and methodology
The main task of this paper is to compare mean deviations from ex post UIP with those deviations
from CIP and ex post RIP of ten EC member states relative to Germany. The ten EC member
states considered here are France, Belgium, The Netherlands, Italy, United Kingdom, Denmark,
Ireland, Spain, Portugal and Greece.' The data used are monthly series of three-month domestic
money market interest rates, spot exchange rates vis-à-vis the Deutsche Mark (DM), forward
exchange rates vis-à-vis the DM with the same three-month maturity and consumer price indices
(CPI) (see Appendix B). Note that the spot and forward exchange rate are defined as the EC
member state's external value vis-à-vis the DM. That is, the perspective of our calculations of
interest parity conditions runs from the domestic country to the foreign country and corresponds
with the continental definition of the exchange rate where Germany is the foreign country and
the other EC countries are viewed as the domestic country.
One of the difficulties with respect to the measurement of money market integration results from
the fact that financial assets are heterogenous. Measuring money market integration with parity
' Luxemburg is excluded from thc analysis bzcausn Luxemburg and Belgium form a monetary union i.e. they share
the sanre short-[erm interest rate and exchange rate.7
conditions boils down to finding similar assets in terms of the quality of debtor, size, depth and
segmentation of money markets and of course term to maturity. Furthermore, for tests of interest
parity conditions it is important that the timing ofthe interest rate data corresponds with the timing
of the exchange rate data (see Appendix B). We agree with Haldane and Pradhan ( 1992b, p. 8)
that domestic money market interest rates are to be preferred topick up the effect ofcapital controls
between EC countries in a way potentially overlooked if eurocurrency interest rates are used.e
Following Gaab et al. (1986, p. 693) we model deviations from CIP, ex post UIP and ex post
RIP in percentages per year. Deviations from CIP are defined as [ln(]ti,.,,3)-ln(Ifi;`,,t3)-
(1213)(P`'-s~]~`100 where i,,,t, and i~`.,,, are the representative continuously compounded domestic
and foreign money market interest rate over the three-month holding period expressed in percentages
per year. The holding period k of the underlying debt instrument is equal to 3 months. s, denotes
the natural logarithm of the spot exchange rate vis-à-vis the DM at the beginning of the t-th month
and f,'' denotes the natural logarithm of the forward exchange rate with the same three-month
maturity vis-à-vis the DM at the beginning of the t-th month. [(12~3)(fl"-sJ]'100 is the three-
month forward premium (discount) vis-à-vis the DM expressed in percentages per year. Similarly,
deviationsfromex postUlParedefinedas [In(I ti,,~,)-In(I ti;`,,,)-(1213)(s,,,-s~]`100where
(1213)(s,,.,-s,)`100 is the realísed rate of depreciation (appreciation) vis-à-vis the DM over the
three-month holding period expressed in percentages per year. Deviations from ex post RIP are
defined as {[In(lfi,,,,)-(1213(P~.3-P~l`100}-{[]n(lfi,'.,,,)-(1213)(p;`„-p!)]}'100 where
(1213)(p,t,-p~'l00 is the change in natural logarithms of domestic consumer price indices over
the three month period in percentages per year. p, is thenatural logarithm of the domestic consumer
price index in month t-1. Gaab et al. argue that the time index t denotes the beginning of a month.
Thus, the t-month price index number is assumed to measure the price level at the beginning of
the next month, i.e. at the end of the t-th month. The ex post exchange risk premium is defined
as the difference between the forward premium (discount) and the realised spot exchange rate
change [(12~3)(P" - sJ -(1213)(s,t, -s~J' 100, expressed in percentages per year. Deviations from
ex post relative PPP are defined as [(1213)(;„ -sJ -(1213)(A,~pJf(1213)(p;`t, -p')]' 100. Finally,
the ex post currency premium is defined as {[(1213)(f,'' - sJJ-(12~3)(s, t, -sJ] f[(1213)(s,t, -sJ -
(1213)(p,r,-p,)f(1213)(p;~„-p')]}'100. We calculate CPI based real interest rates for three
reasons. First, its monthly availability (except for Ireland); second, the EMU-criterion for inflation
" Euromarkcts are almost free of capi[al controls (sr.~ e.g. Fukao and Hanaraki 1987, p. 48).8
is framed in terms of changes in the CPI (see ltalianer 1993, p. 24) and third, the basket of goods
contains traded and non-traded goods and thus is a better measure of the purchasing power of
the domestic country than when the basket only contained traded goods.
Price expectations and exchange rate expectations have been proxied by their observed values
on the basis of rational expectations. Of course, there are other methods to model inflationary
and exchange rate expectations e.g. from an ARIMA model (see e.g. Barro and Sala-I-Martin
1990, p. I7), survey data (see e.g. Haldane and Pradhan 1992b) or regression analysis.' However,
these other methods do not rule out systematic forecast ermrs. We agree with Tease et al. (1991,
p. ] 19) who argue that: "The precise choice of the method to measure inflationary expectations
is unlikely to alter the longer-term trends in the data although it may affect the timing and turning
points."
We split the sample period March 1979-June 1993 into four subperiods reflecting the various
phases of development of the EMS following Ungerer (1990, p. 334). Ungerer characterises the
first phase of the EMS (Mazch 1979-March 1983) as a period of trial and orientation. As is
illustrated in Table 2 during the first phase of the EMS relative frequent and large ezchange rate
realignments within the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the EMS occurred. The exchange
rate of high inflation EC countries was usually devalued immediately during periods of exchange
rate tensions to maintain competitiveness. As a result the EMS behaved more or less as a"crawling
peg" system.
~ The use of survey data suffen from the methodological problem Ihat brokers in foreign exchange markets do not
have an interest in revruling their real intarests. Survey data may not f~e an accurate measure ofmarket participants
true expectatations or pcople do no act on the expectations they express (Boughton 1988, p. 13).9
Table 2- D.ites and sizes of EMS realignments over the period March 1979-June 1993'
Percem changcs
Ona BlLFR DKR DM DRA ESC FF HFL IRL LIT' PPA UKL'
24109179 - -7.W t?.W - - - - - - - -
30III179 . -?.W - - - - - - - - -
L3103l81 .- - - - - - - - -6.W - -
OS110181 - - t5.50 - - -l.W t5.50 - -3.W - -
22l02l8? -8.50 -3.W - - - - - - - - -
14I06182 - - tq.25 - - -5.75 tq.25 - -2.75 - -
21I07183 t1.50 t2.50 t5.50 - - -2.50 t3.50 -3.50 -2.50 - -
IBIOSl83" - I .90 - I .90 - L90 - - - 1.90 - I -90 -1.90 - I .90 - -
17I09184 - - - - - - - - - - -
22l07B5 t2 W t2.W t2.W - - t2.W f2.W t2.W -6.W - -
07104l86 tI.W tI.W t3.W - - -3.W f3.W - - - -
04108186 - - - '- - - - -S.W - - -
12IOI187 t2.W - t3.W - - - t3.W - - - -
08IOI190 - - - - - - - - -3.68 - -
Iq109192` t3.50 f3.50 t3.50 - t3.5U t3.50 t3.50 t3.50 -3.50 t3.50 t3.50
17109192` - - - - - - - - - -S.W -
23111192 - - - - -6.W - - - - -6.W -
OI102193 - - - - - - - - 10.00 - -
14105193 - - - - -6.50 - - - - -B.W -
Spnbols: t - rovalualion - - Jcvaluatinn
' Cun;-EMSciwntriaswhichpanicipateinthcERMofthcEMSaru:B.:Igium,Dunrnark.Gemuny,France,IrelanJ,Italy,Fram:c,theNetherlands
and Luxcmburg (aa of March 13th, 1979), Spain ( aa of Junc 16th. 1989), tho UnitoJ Kingdom (as ol' CXtobcr 8, 1990) and Portugal (as uf
April óth. 1992). Greece Joea not panicipate in thc ERM. Belgium, 0.nmarl, Germany. Fronce, Iroland, the Nethedanda and Luxemburg
havc a Ouawtion margin of t?.?5 ~, Ilaly t 6~ end ax of )anuary 8th. 1990 t?'SZ, Spsin, Portugal andthe United Kingdom t 6~.
Grecce, Spain, Ponugal and lhe UniteJ Kingdom bebng to tha non-eore-EMS coumriea.
" AJjustmcm of the thcorctical cemrol ratu of thc pounJ stcrling ba~d on the market rates of May Ilth. 1983.
` Thc reslignmcN Jatcs of Septcmlxr 14th and 17th. 1992 rencct the ERM crisis.
' 7ite Unitad KingJum anJ Italy tcmporerily suspanded ERM participation on September 17th, 1992.
Sourcc: Eumstat (199J, p. 99).
!n the second phase of the EMS (April 1983-September 1987) the number of exchange rate
realignments dropped sharply reflecting the monetary policy consensus within the EMS to fight
intlation. This perind of ronsolyduiion was characterised by a widespread consensus to follow
stability-oriented policies, an increasing convergence in inflation rates, and by long periods without
realignments. Monetary and official intervention policies of individual EC member states aimed
at fixing nominal exchange rates to reduce inflation and inFlationaryexpectations toGerman levels.
According to De Grauwe (1992), duríng this phase the DM became the "anchor for price stability"
in the EMS. The anti-inflationary monetary policy of the Bundesbank served as the reference
point for the monetary policies of other EMS countries. Therefore, several EMS countries (e.g.
the Netherlands and more recently France and Belgium) gave up parts of their monetary policy
independence and aimed at stabilizing their exchange rate against the DM by (bilateral)
intralnarginal intervention and by maintaining appropriate interest rate differentials vis-à-vis
Germany. This is called the Germun dominunce hypothe.ris.
During the third phase ofthe EMS (October 1987-September 1992) no major realignment occurred
for more than five and a half years until the ERM crisis of September 1992. The third period
starts after the Basle-Nyborg Agreement of September 1987 which established a more Flexible10
and concerted use of available instruments (official intervention, exchange rate movements within
the band and interest rate changes) to promote exchange rate stability in the ERM (Committee
of Governors of the central banks of the member states of the European Community 1992, p.
12). Improved coordination of interest rate policies to keep the exchange rates within the band
and a more flexible use of existing fluctuation margins helped to prevent speculative attacks on
the ERM central rates. In addition, a number of EC countries entered the ERM of the EMS. Intra-
European exchange rate stability increased substantially despite the elimination of remaining
restrictions on short-term and long-term capital flows as from 1 July 1990, which potentially gives
rise to speculative attacks. Notwithstanding these advantageous developments, the third phase
was considered as a period of re-examination, in the light of growing concerns about the
"asymmetry" in the EMS where Germany focused on price stability and other ERM-countries
focused on maintaining their currency's exchange rates vis-à-vis the DM.
Finally, the fourth phase of the EMS (October 1992-1une 1993) marks the period after the
turbulence in the exchange markets of September 1992 which was earmarked by the Committee
of Governors of the central banks of the member states of the European Community (1993, p.
2) as '[..] the most serious crisis of the EMS since its inception.' We call this period the period
of destabilisation. The period is characterised by uncertainty about EC exchange rate levels,
relatively low inflation rates in EC countries and ergo apotential for lower nominal and real interest
rates.
IV Empirical results
The tests of the degree of short-term capital mobility of type I, 11 and III rely on calculations
of inean deviations from C1P, ex post UIP and ex post RIP in percentages per year."' Table
3 summarises all three types of perfect capital mobility which were introduced in Table I over
the period March 1979-June 1993 and the subperiods March 1979-March 1983, April 1983-Sep-
tember 1987, October 1987-September 1992 and October 1992-June 1993 (see Section III). In
addition, Table 3 decomposes the mean deviation from ex post UIP into a country premium and
an ex post exchange risk premium, and the mean deviation from ex post RIP into a country
'" Mother possibility ís to rely on rogrrssíon analysis tiir tests of CIP, UIP and RIP.II
premium, an ex post exchange risk premium and a deviation from ex post relative PPP. Each
of these f'actors should be zero for a particular type of perfect capital mobility to hold." Although
the calculations inTable 3 have been confined to the bilateral relationships between ten EC member
states and Germany, Table 3 indirectly also determines those deviations between any two EC
countries. For example, if we know the mean deviation from ex post RIP between France and
Germany and the mean deviation from ex post RIP between the United Kingdom and Germany
we are able to calculate the mean deviation from ex post RIP between France and the United
Kingdom in the following way: r"K r''w` -ruK r"r~ (r"`" -r"`J` The same holds ~.1i3- I.~t3- ~.~ti- t,tt3- t.it3 i,tt3)-
ofcourse for the building blocks ofex post RIP, that is, thecountry premium, the ex post exchange
risk premium and the deviation from ex post relative PPP.
(I) Deviu~inns from CIP
The CIP condition is the least stringent criterion for money market integration. Deviations from
CIP i.e. country premia measure the ability to move money market assets across national borders.
The country premium reflects the existence of transaction costs, capital controls (existing or
expected), information costs, discriminatory tax laws, default risk and possibly imperfections
in the data. If the country premium is negative, the domestic interest rate is artificially low to
the DM interest rate and capital export restrictions must exist (Commission of the European
Communities 1990, p. 160). The nominal interest differentials is smaller than the forward premium.
According to Table 3 the Netherlands, Belgium, Ireland and the United Kingdom have average
country premia in percentage per year of not more than 50 basis points in absolute value over
the period March 1979-June 1993 reflecting probably only transaction costs. The United Kingdom
is the only non-core-EMS country with a country premium of not more than 50 basis points in
absolute value. These countries are followed at some distance by the other core-EMS countries
Italy and France. Spain, Portugal and probably also Greece (on the basis of the periods October
1987-September 1992 and October 1992-1une 1993) have high country premia and clearly
maintained many capital controls over the period March 1979-June 1993. The results confirm
the findings of a previous study of inean deviations from CIP relative to Germany over the period
September 1982 to April 1988 except for Ireland (see "One Market, One Money" Commission
of the European Communities 1990, pp. 160-161).
" Note that it is pcrsibte that (wnte ot) the.~e factors may aJd up to zero while in fact they differ from 7ero.12
Table 3- The decomposition of European money market interest rate differentials relative
to Germany: averages of monthly observations (percentages per year)12















Fnncc -1.64 2.03 0.39 -0.06 1.98 0.74
Belgium -0.55 1.17 0.92 0.77 2.24 1.69
The Netherlands -0.17 0.32 O.IS 0.42 0.74 0.58
Iuly -1.40 2.85 1.45 -0.77 2.08 0.66
Unitcd Kingdom -0.27 I.62 1.36 -0.67 0.95 0.69
Danmark -0.64 2.31 1.68 -0.04 2.2A 1.64
Ireland -0.27 2.35 2.07 -0.93 1.42 1.15
Spain - 1.93 3.84 1.92 -0.50 3.35 1.42
Portugal -4.46 3.73 -0.73 -I.00 2.74 -1.72
GreecC - - -3.92 1.12 - -2.60















Fnnce -3.85 2.07 -1.78 -0.47 1.60 -2.25
Belgium -1.53 0.17 - 1.36 3.71 3.88 2.35
The Nelóerlands -0.47 0.43 -0.04 0.22 0.64 0.17
luly 4.76 5.68 0.92 -4.29 1.39 -3.37
Uniled Kingdom -0.73 5.16 4.43 -5.66 -0.49 -1 .23
pcnnurk - 1.87 1.44 -0.43 1.17 2.61 0.74
Irelsnd -1.00 4.63 3.62 -6.54 -1.92 -2.92
Spain -4.34 1.95 -~.40 0.79 2.73 -1.61
Portug.l -7.31 3.32 -3.99 -1 .34 1 .98 -5.33
Grcece` - - -0.68 0.63 - fi.05















Fraru:e - 1.62 2.40 0.78 -0.12 2.28 0.66
B.:Igium -0.44 3.07 2.62 -1.?3 1.84 1.40
The Nelherlanda -0.IB 0.38 0.20 0.42 0.80 0.62
haly -0.13 3.87 3.73 -1.00 2.87 2.74
Uni1cJ Kingdom -0.41 0.24 A.17 2.02 2.26 1.85
U:nmark - 0.10 2.90 ~.80 - 1.37 1.54 1.44
Ircland -0.52 2.46 1.94 0.67 3.13 2.61
Spain -2.29 5.65 3.36 - 1.21 4.44 2.15
Ponugal -7.91 4.10 -3.81 2.40 6.50 -1.40
Grcecc - - -8.27 4.12 - 3.14
'- S.x for an earlier Jexomlxitiitíon of European mem~y markct interest ratc Jiffcra;ntial~ rolativn to G~rmany, [he
study 'Onc Market, One Money', Commission of Ihe Europran Communitiati (1990, pp. 160-161).13
Table 3 - Continued















France -0.09 I.áO 1.51 0.12 1.72 1.63
BzlQium 0.06 1.26 1.74 0.03 1.31 1.36
Thz Nerherlanda 0.07 0.18 0.25 0.39 0.57 0.64
Iraly 0.03 3.09 3.12 -1.48 I.61 1.64
Uniu:d Kingdom 0.18 2.74 2.92 - 1.88 0.85 1.03
Dcnmark -0.10 2.12 2.02 -0.24 1.88 1.78
Irzl~nd 0.74 1.83 2.17 -0.16 1.66 2.01
Sp~in O.I9 6.2R 6.48 -3.75 2.53 2.73
PonuBsl 0.51 4.95 5.46 -5.53 -0.57 -0.06
Groccz -3.32 4.01 0.68 -1.19 2.82 -0.50















Prmke -U.Iw 2.5-1 ?.aS 1.38 3.92 J.83
Bzlkimn 20h U.24 0.29 1.7U 1.94 199
Thc NcthzrkMa 0.02 0.27 0.30 I.81 2.08 2.1 I
luly -0.23 -20.32 -20.56 24.55 4.23 3.99
Unitzd Kingdom 0.18 -16.74 - 16.56 18.41 1.66 1.84
Dcnmark -0.73 4.82 4.09 2.70 7.52 6.79
Ircland 1.06 -7.24 fi.18 14.93 7.69 8.75
Spain -0.69 -12A4 -13.63 18.48 5.54 4.85
Punugal -1.41 -4.35 -5.76 10.71 6.36 4.95
Grcccz -3.22 3.42 2.19 0.39 5.81 2.59
' Calculation ovzr tlrc period May 1980-April 1993
a Cdculation ovzr the period May 1980-March 1983
The period before the ERM crisis can best seen as a yardstick of the present degree of money
market integration because it will take some time for financial markets to calm down and a clear
pictureon the degree of money market integration will emerge. During the period ofdestabilisation
(October 1992-June 1993) policy deviations and diverging behaviour of fundamentals in the EC
with an increasing degree of (destabilising) short-term capital flows caused high increases in nominal
interest rates to defend exchange rates.
During the first phase of the EMS (March 1979-March 1983) only the Netherlands has a country
premium ofnot more than 50 basis points in absolute value. In the second phase ofthe EMS (April
1983-September 1987) already six countries have country premia of not more than 50 basis points
in absolute value: Denmark, the Netherlands, Ireland, the United Kingdom, Italy and Belgium.14
In the third phase of the EMS (October 1987-September 1992) also France and Spain are included
into the group of countries with low country premia with respect to Germany. Portugal and in
particular Greece are the notable exceptions to the rule." Investment in Portuguese Escudo gave
an annual excess return of 0.51 per cent while investment in the Greek Drachma gave an annual
loss of 3.32 per cent. An important explanation for above results was the directive of 24 lune
1988, which is part of the Single Market Programme, when the European Commission stated
that as from I July 1990 all short-term and long-term capital movements in the EC are to be free
of restrictions. Greece, Ireland, Spain and Portugal do not have to fulfil this directive until 31
December 1992. Moreover, Portugal and Greece have the possibility to postpone implementation
of this directive till 31 December 1995. In practice thís meant that especially restrictions on short-
term capital movements had to disappear (many restrictions on long-term capital movements were
already lifted earlier).
(2) Ex pns~ exchange ri.ck premiu
Table 3 also presents the ex post exchange risk premium. The ex post exchange risk premium
is the difference between the forward premium (discount) and the realised spot exchange rate
change. It is difficult to know the exact sign and magnitude of the exchange risk premium because
the markets expecta[ion of the exchange rate is not directly observable so ex post devaluation
in stead of ex ante devaluation has to be used. For example, a negative exchange risk premium
mayarise when the ex post devaluation exceeds the forward premium which is the case for Ireland,
Italy, Spain, Portugal and the United Kingdom during the ERM crisis of September 1992. The
exchange risk premia generally are rather persistent. The ex post exchange risk premium declines
slowly in the core-EMS countries from September 1987 onwards despite relatively large intra-
European exchange rate stability until the exchange crisis of September 1992 (compare the
subperiods March 1979-March 1983 and October 1987-September 1992). In principle, as theory
predicts the larger exchange rate fluctuations are allowed the higher the ezchange risk premium.
Non-core-EMS countries show higher exchange risk premia than core-EMS countries. Although
some exchange rates of EMS countries are within a small band, the possibility of an ezchange
rate realignment in the EMS, always influences nominal exchange rate expectations which cause
nominal short-term (and long-term) interest rate divergences. Table 3 unmistakably illustrates
that exchange rate volatility is the principal source limiting money market integration in the EC.
" If capital controls exist, both arbitrageurs and speculators are prevented from eliminating profit oppurtunities.IS
Exchange rate volatility makes uncovered domestic money market instruments and German money
market instruments less than perfect substitutes so German investors only are wi!ling to hold the
domestic assets if they obtain compensation in the form of an exchange risk premium. This
argument assumes that CIP holds and the ex post exchange risk premium is a good measure of
the willingness to hold domestic assets. 1'he willingness to hold domestic assets crucially depends
on the devaluation risk i.e. the timing and size of devaluations. According to Table 3 the
Netherlands is the only country that has an average exchange risk premium in percentage per
year of not more than 50 basis points over the period March 1979-June 1993. Moreover, the
Netherlands is the only country with exchange risk premia in percentage per year of not more
than 50 basis points in all subperiods.
(3) Deviu~ioru~ fram ex posi U!P
A stronger criterion for money market integration is the UIP condition. The UIP condition is
the criterion we identify with money market integration and foreign exchange market integration.
A positive deviation from ex post UIP means that the marke[ requires a higher expected return
from domestic investments than from German investments. According to table 3 the smallest mean
deviation from ex post UIP relative to Germany over the period March 1979-June 1993 is that
of the Netherlands. This indicates high money market integration between the Netherlands and
Germany. The Netherlands is followed by France, Portugal, Belgium, the United Kingdom, Italy,
Denmark, Spain, ireland and Greece respectively. Surprisingly, according to the UIP criterion
the money market of the United Kingdom is not very well integrated with the money market of
Germany in contrast with the integration found according to the CIP criterion. German investors
who invest in the United Kingdom apparently demand an exchange risk premium before they
are willing to invest in the United Kingdom. German investors are risk-averse and demand
compensation in the form of an (possibly time-varying) exchange risk premium to hold the more
risky assets of other EC countries. The realized rate of return on domestic money market assets
exceeds the return on German money market assets. In general, the relative strengths of risk
aversion in the two countries (as well as elsewhere) will play a key role in determining the realized
exchange risk premium. Another factor will be relative size of asset positions. More risk averse
German investors will only hold those assets of EC countries with less frequent and sizeable
realignments (i.e. devaluations) or will demand a higher exchange risk premium. In the short-run
exchange risk premia impair UIP and thus money market integration due to realised devaluations
as was the case during the exchange crisis of September 1992.l6
Notwithstanding above results, the interpretation ofex post UIP remains unclear because it entails
ajoint test oftwo underlying hypotheses. Deviations from ez post U1P may reflect a lack of short-
term capital mobility of type II (country andlorexchange risk premia) andlor expectational errors.
Consequently, inference ofthe degree of money market integration based upon ex post UIP differen-
tials must be done with caution. Note also that inference ofthe degree of money market integration
based upon one segment of the domestic and foreign money markets corresponding with two
comparable money market assets is not always wise. Moreover, in [he ERM ofthe EMS short-term
nominal interest rates are used as policy instruments to keep exchange rates within the bands.
Fukao en Hanazaki (1987, p. 75) argue: 'Under an actual adjustable peg system such as the EMS,
the nominal interest rates are not equalised in the short-run. This divergence of interest rates is
due to the allowed margin of movements in the exchange rates and possible future changes in
the parity rates.' When financial markets expect an exchange rate devaluation, high nominal short-
term nominal interest rate differentials relative to Germany are needed to maintain the exchange
rate in the allowed fluctuation margins of the EMS. Short-term nominal interest rates fluctuate
in response to policy forces and not to murket forces. Therefore, it is hard to isolate the market
induced effect of money market integration on short-term nominal interest rates from the policy
induced effect of money market integration. Consequetttly, declining UIP (CIP and RIP) differentials
may alsobe attributed to convergence in the implementation and performanceof monetary policies
of EC countries as measured by the development of four key variables: inflation rates, real exchange
rates, real short-term interest rates (money market rates) and real long-term interest rates (capital
mazket rates) (Eijffinger 1993, p. 182).'" In addition, we are aware of the fact that EC money
market interest rates are not only influenced by intra-EC capital mobility, but also by extra-EC
capital mobility in accordance with international interest arbitrage relationships. Thus, capital
mobility between the EC and the rest oftheworld may confuse the issue ofineasurement ofcapital
mobility within the EC. Changing demand for short-term capital in the EC may change the supply
of capital from abroad.
(4J Deviations from ex post relotive PPP
The ex post relative PPP condition holds if the ex post real exchange rate between two countries
remains constant. This means that the domestic currency depreciates at a rate equal to the ex post
inflation differential. [t also means that in the absence of relative price changes the nominal
" Of course, the forward promium (discount) and the expncted devaluation (revaluation) also incorporate market
participant' expectations alxwt the differences between domestic and Garman inflation rates.17
exchange rate changeequals the real exchange rate change. Generally, the failureof ex post relative
PPP in the short-run is evident from Table 3 for most of the ten EC countries during the sample
period and subperiods except for the Netherlands. Because deviations from ex post relative PPP
are generally smaller than ex post exchange risk premia, ex post exchange risk premia aze the
main sourceofdeviations from ex post RIP. With intlation rates gradually coming down, increasing
nominal exchange ra[e stability in the EMS also exerted a short-run stabilizing effect on intra-EMS
real exchange rates.
Again, ex post relative PPP is hard to interpret. Calculations of ex post relative PPP not only
require approximation of expected devaluation but also approximation of expected relative price
changes by their observed values (Commission of the European Communities 1990, p. 160). In
addition, deviations from ex post PPP might be due to relative price changes oftradable and non-
tradables in the consumption basket.
Table2 shows that the size and frequencyof realignments has decreased with time. Given divergent
inflation rates, these realignments have been necessary to preserve real exchange-rate equilibrium
within the EMS (Collins 1988, p. 112). However, theoretical work on the credibility of monetary
policy suggests that, if counWes with higher inflation rates are to gain anti-inflation credibility
through the EMS membership in order to reduce their inflation rate to German levels, they need
a real appreciating exchange rate with Germany. This is because full adjustment ofexchange rates
would amount to accommodation of domestic inflationary pressures, whereas less than full
adjustmentofexchangerates would involvean element ofpunishment forexcess domestic inflation
by squeezing profits margins of producers of tradeable goods (Bleany 1992, p. 66). Giavazzi and
Pagano (1988, p. 1055) argue: "First, between successive realignments, excess inflation (combining
with [he fixity ofthe nominalexchange rate) results in one-for-oneappreciation of the real exchange
rate. Second, at realignment dates, excess inflation countries obtain devaluations which are generally
insufficient to make-up for the real appreciation experienced since the previous realignment. The
first factor introduces real exchange rate Fluctuation between realignments while the second factor
introduces a trend of real appreciation in the exchange rates of high inflation countries. Observe
that movements in real exchange rates tend to be dominated by nominal exchange rate rather than
by relative price level movements. EMS countries which have experienced relatively high inflation
rates experienced real exchange rate appreciation (Giavazzi and Pagano 1988, p. 1055). With
respect to the first argument of Giavazzi and Pagano, as Table 3 illustrates, nominal exchange18
ratcs didn't adjust fully to compensate for inflation differentials if ncgativc PPP deviations occur
(March 1979-June 1993) except with respt. ~ct to the Netherlands and 13elgium. However, "I'able
111 also complies with mean reversion in the real exchange as indicated by alternating positive
and negative deviations from ex post relative PPP for many EC countries and the subperiod October
1992-June 1993 when ex post relative PPP deviations of several EC countries turned highly positive.
We would like to make the following argument. Real depreciating countries not only loose
credibility but money market integration as well because exchange rate untxrtainties increase.
However, real depreciating countries gain competitiveness because domestic goods and services
become relatively cheaper as compared to foreign goods and services.
(S) F~ post currency premia
It is expected that financial markets translate monetary uncertainties - i.e. expected exchange rate
and inflation variability - into higher currency premia, consisting of exchange risk premia and
deviations from relative PPP (see (2) and (4) above). Notable declines in currency premiaoccurred
for Spain, Portugal and the United Kingdom when they entered the ERM of the EMS (comparing
the subperiod April 1983-September 1987 with the subperiod October 1987-September 1992).
EMS discipline may have helped to limit previous nominal devaluation tendencies of these countries.
Moreover, ERM membership of Spain, Portugal and the United Kingdom probably sharply
increased the substitutability ofbonds. However, the overall result is that currency premia remain
rather persistent.15 This means that even with the equalisation of covered interest rates, lazge
differentials in real interest rates remain (Frankel 1992, p. 201). Bonds are not perfect substitutes
for equities or for physical capital.
(6) Deviarions from ex post RIP
The RIP condition is the strongest criterion for money market integration. In fact, theRIP condition
not only measures money market integration but non-financial integration as well (see section
II). Deviations from ex post RIP are due to country and currency factors. Table 3 shows that
currency factors dominate country factors in explaining real interest rate differentials with respect
to Germany. Declining real interest rate differentials may point to increased cross-border trade
in goods and services in Europe. Real interest convergence may be explained by the Single Market
project to complete an internal market for persons, goods, services and capital in the European
" Note that unexpected high or low inflation rates (news about inflation rates) may be an important determinant of
ex ante PPP deviations.19
Community by the end of 1992 (or later). The Netherlands and France are the EC countries showing
the highest degree of short-term financial and non-financial integration with Germany (March
1979-June 1993). In general, Table 3 shows that ex post RIP has been violated because the building
blocks of ex post RIP i.e. ex post UIP and ex post PPP have been violated. However, the decline
in deviations from ex post RIP cannot be denied.
The interpretation of the RIP condition is even more difficult than the interpretation of the UIP
condition. Particularly, the interpretation of the RIP condition becomes moredifficult in countries
with relatively high and variable inflation rates. RIP deviations may be due to irrational expectations
ofexchange rates uru! inflation rates, the timing ofthedataused, the existence ofnon-traded goods
in the basket ofconsumer goods and ofcourse the lack of money market integration andlor short-
term non-tinancial integration. The low RIP values for Portugal and Greece over the period October
1987-Septeber 1992 are probably due to measurement errors. The Economist (1992, p. 23) azgues:
'[...] the criterion of real interest parity is much more demanding than it seems to be. Exchange
rate volatility undermines it in two ways: first by adding a risk premium to the cost of cover in
the foreign exchange market [so UIP dces not hold]; and, second by breaking the link between
exchangeratesand differences in inflation rates [so PPP dces not hold]' . Shorr-rermex post relative
PPP may be an unrealistic asswnption with respect to money market integration, because as was
argued by Boughton (1988, p. 18) it has "[...] little or no bearing on short- or medium-term
developments." That is, relative prices of domestic and foreign goods may be sticky in the short-
run.1ó Especially, in the short-run the real exchange rate may Fluctuate around its equilibrium
value while in the long run we have mean reversion of the real exchange rate.
Note, that deviations from ex post UIP and ex post relative PPP determining RIP have opposite
signs and often partly cancel out. The depreciation of thedomestic currency is smaller than needed
to maintain competitiveness which was lost due to high domestic inflation." Therefore the real
exchange rate appreciates (where the domestic inflation exceeds the German inFlation and the
nominal exchange rate depreciation is relatively small) while UIP remains positive. This implies
that a country imports deflation given a high degree of openness. The relative small depreciation
may be explained by the stabilisation of nominal exchange rates in the EMS. The worse record
16 Brcaux non-financial intCgration is typically perceiv~xl to take plac~ overa longer time horizon, it might be better
to use yearly Jata rather than monthly data to as.e.wti thc dngre~ of non-tinancial intcgration.
" Of cour~e, compelitive real d~prax iations nwy have nGgativr spillovcr effr,cts to othrr EC amntries.20
of inflation and concomitant devaluation tendencies required countries like, Spain, Portugal, Greece,
Italy and the United Kingdom to keep their money market interest rate above that in Germany.'"
Deviations from CIP, ez post UIP und ex posr RIP compared
If we compare deviations from CIP, ex post UIP and ex post RIP over the period April 1983-
September 1987 in the present paper with those deviations over the approximately similar period
September 1982-April 1988 previously calculated by the European Commission ( 1990, Box 6.5,
pp. 160-161) and reproduced in Lemmen and Eijffinger (1993b, p. 202), we safely may conclude
that our calculations are of the same order of magnitude. However, note that our calculations
for the period April 1983-September 1987 are slightly lower in absolute value than those for the
period September 1982-April 1988 calculated by the European Commission due to the existence
of capital controls in the early eighties. If we compare deviations from CIP over the period
September 1982-April 1988 with those deviations over the period October 1987-September 1992
in the present paper, we conclude that capital mobility of type I between all EC member states
and Germany has increased significantly after April 1988. Only Portugal and Greece have deviations
from CIP above 50 basis points in absolute value over the period Ctctober 1987-September 1992
while all countries except (United Kingdom, Belgium and the Netherlands show deviations from
CIP above 50 basis points in absolute value (September 1982-April 1988). The same holds to
a lesser extent for deviations from ex post RIP. Deviations from ex post UIP, however, show
no clear tendency to decline for the greater part of EC countries.
Figure 1(see Appendix A) plots movements in short-term mean deviations from CIP, ex post
UIP and ex post RIP of ten EC countries relative to Germany. The solid line denotes CIP, the
dotted line denote ex post UIP and the dashed line denotes ex post RIP deviations. Figure 1
confirms the calculations in Table 2. Figure 1 may be particular helpful to recognise the structural
breaks closely connected with the various phases ofdevelopment of the EMS. From an inspection
of CIP, UIP and RIP deviations in Figure 1, it appears that exchange risk premia and currency
premia - and therefore deviations from ex post UIP and ex post RIP respectively - remain rather
persistent. Contrary to C[P deviations which almost have disappeared (except with respect to
Portugal and Greece). RIP and UIP deviations declined slowly until the ERM crisis of September
1992. Furthermore, evidence from both Figure 1 as Table 3 indicate that CIP deviations are much
'g The history of high inflation in those countries has made these countries tnore dependent on short-term financing
thsn Gentntty, and thus more settsitive to shifts in short-tertn nominal interest rates.21
smaller than RIP deviations. This confirm that real integration lags (geographical) money market
integration in the EC.
As is illustrated in figure 1, exchange rates were unstable causing considerable UIP variability.
Generally, Figure I reveals large swings in deviations from UIP compared to those devia[ions
from C1P when devaluations of a particular currency are expected to take place. In general, fluc-
tuations in UIP are larger than fluctuations in CIP corresponding with the earlier conclusion that
ezchange rate fluctuations in the EC nowadays hamper further money market integration.
Furthermore, CIP, UIP and RIP deviations of core-EMS countries generally are more stable than
those deviations of non-core-EMS coun[ries. The exchange rate variability of the Netherlands,
Belgium, France, Denmark, Ireland and Italy is lower than the exchange rate variability of Portugal,
Spain, Greece and the United Kingdom.
Observe from Figure 1 that with nearly perfect money market integration - e.g. between the
Netherlands and Germany - RIP is more variable than UIP and CIP on average. In the case of
the Netherlands and Germany with a fixed parity between the Guilder and the Deutsche Mark
both nominal money market interest rates are approximately equalised. Therefore real money
market interest rate differentials between both countries reflect differences in national inflation
rates. With imperfect money market integration - e.g. between Spain and Germany - UIP is more
variable than RIP and CIP. In the case ofSpain and Germany both nominal money market interest
rates and exchange rates move to offset differences in national inflation rates.
Thecomparison ofthe realignment dates in Table 2 with the movements ofex post UIP differentials
reveals an important phenomenon in European money markets. The ex ante UIP condition implies
that, ifa realignment is expected, uncovered returns on currencies which are expected to devalue
rise above those returns on currencies which are expected to revalue. However, this argument
is only true if the exchange rate devaluation c.q. revaluation is anticipated (see e.g. Koedijk and
Kool 1993, pp. 162-163). If e.g. an exchange rate devaluation is anticipated, the nominal interest
rate differential íncreases and a significant positive uncovered return arises before the devaluation
takes place. If on the other hand the exchange rate devaluation is not anticipated, the nominal
interest ratedifferential remains the sameand no significant positive uncovered return arises before
the devaluation takes place. De Boissieu (1988, p. 59) remarks about deviations from ex post
UIP: '(...) the inability of operators to forecast accurately the date and the extent of realignments22
may explain differences in the ex post returns on financial assets with the same maturity
denominated in different currencies.' The ERM crisis of September 1992 was largely unanticipated.
In the period October 1992-June 1993 large negative uncovered interest differentials occurred
in Ireland, Italy, Spain, Portugal and the United Kingdom. Unfortunately, the efforts following
the ERM crisis to defend the exchange rates within the chosen bands through high nominal money
market interest rates lacked credibility. Consequently, on August lth 1993 ERM bands were
widened to f 15 ~ except for the band between the Netherlands and Germany which remained
unchanged at f 2.25qo.
V Conclusions
This paper documents the available evidence on money market integration between ten EC countries
and Germany. Defining the concept of money market integration was important because the three
interest parity conditions measure different types of perfect capital mobility. We start our sample
period in March 1979 when some EC members states tried to limit fluctuations in the nominal
exchange rates linking their national currencies through the European Monetary System (EMS).
The evidence presented in this paper provides strong support for an increasing degree of money
market integration in the EC. In particular, the ability to move short-term capital across national
borders was greatly enlarged. Almost perfect capital mobility of type 1 can be said to exist between
eight EC member states and Germany. Portugal and Greece are the excep[ions to the rule and
are not well integrated with Germany according to the CIP condition. However, the willingness
to move short-term capital across national borders increased rather slowly. Presently, UIP only
exists between the Netherlands and Germany. lnvestors still are risk averse and demand a premium
to cover themselves against the exchange risk arising from realised or expected devaluation.
Devaluation risk as measured by the exchange risk premium is the main factor impairíng U1P
and thus money market integration. Notwithstanding increased nominal and real exchange rate
stability in the EMS af[er the Basle-Nyborg Agreement of September 12th 1987, exchange rate
and currency premia remain rather persistent.
We also observed from Table 3 and Figure 1 that although CIP deviations were approximately
zero for almostall EC countries, UIP and RlPdeviations remained rather persistent. Consequently,z3
money market integration eventually also needs real integration. Higher int7ation rates are expected
to translate into a worsening in competitiveness ( real appreciation) under a fixed but adjustable
exchange rate regime, which in turn dampens prices and hence promotes inflation convergence.
The higher degree of capital mobility of type I may also speed up the spread of financial and
economic shocks in one EMS country to other EMS countries as the ERM crisis has proved.
Morgan Guaranty Trust Company (1992, p. 10) argues: "Indeed, because the breadth and depth
of the last many years' integration drive amplify synchronous tendencies across the region,
deflationary forces in individual European countries are mutually reinforcing to a degree widely
underestimated today." When tinancial markets calm down CIP differentials areexpected todecline
fast since capital controls simply do not exist or are not effective. However, exchange risk premia
and consequently UIP differentials are expected to last for a longer time and to come down rather
slowly.24
Appendix A
Ftigure 1- Deviations from CIP, ex post UIP and ex post RIP of ten EC member states relative to
Germany (in pcrcentages per year)
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